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Abstract
This paper studies a Diamond-Dybvig model of ￿nancial intermediation providing insurance
against unobservable liquidity shocks in the presence of unobservable trades on private markets.
We show that in this case competitive equilibria are ine¢ cient. A social planner ￿nds it bene￿cial
to introduce a wedge between the interest rate implicit in optimal allocations and the economy￿ s
marginal rate of transformation. This improves risk-sharing by reducing the attractiveness of
joint deviations where agents simultaneously misrepresent their type and engage in trades on
private markets. We propose a simple implementation of the optimum that imposes a constraint
on the portfolio share that ￿nancial intermediaries need to invest in short-term assets. In the
case of Diamond-Dybvig preferences, the optimal allocation coincides with the unconstrained
optimum. For more general preferences, the optimal allocation does not coincide with the
unconstrained optimum, and the direction of the policy intervention depends on the nature of
the shocks in a manner that we precisely characterize.
Keywords: Optimal Regulations, Financial Intermediation, Optimal Contracts, Market Fail-
ures, Mechanism Design.
1 Introduction
A key role of ￿nancial intermediaries is to provide insurance against liquidity shocks. Accordingly,
the regulation of ￿nancial intermediaries is an important concern for central banks and is a fre-
quent topic of debate in the policy-making community. In this paper we answer several important
questions. Can markets provide and allocate liquidity insurance e¢ ciently? If not, can we precisely
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1identify the origin of the market failure? Can a regulator design a simple policy rule to improve on
the allocations provided by competitive markets alone?
Liquidity is a catch-all term referring to several di⁄erent concepts (see, for example, von Thad-
den 1999). This paper discusses the desire of agents to insure against liquidity shocks that might
a⁄ect them in the future. We focus, in particular, on the aggregate amount of resources set aside
to satisfy liquidity shocks. In the model, this corresponds to the fraction of savings invested in
short term assets, which we refer to as aggregate liquidity. We identify a market failure leading to
the underprovision of liquidity. We then show that a simple regulation, working through a general
equilibrium channel by lowering long term interest rates, can restore e¢ ciency. The regulatory in-
tervention is justi￿ed not by concerns about individual intermediaries but rather by the inadequacy
of the aggregate amount of investment in short-term assets in the ￿nancial system as a whole.
More speci￿cally, we study a model where ￿nancial intermediaries act as providers of insurance
against liquidity shocks, in the spirit to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Jacklin (1987), and Allen and
Gale (2004). The Diamond-Dybvig model is an established workhorse for positive and normative
analysis of ￿nancial intermediation. Its simplicity allows for a precise understanding of the nature of
potential market failures and the mechanics of prescribed policy interventions. In this model, some
agents receive liquidity shocks that a⁄ect their consumption opportunities. Agents who receive
high liquidity shocks value early consumption only and derive a higher indirect marginal utility of
income.1
We impose two informational frictions. Our results are driven by their interactions. The ￿rst
friction is that liquidity shocks are private information to the agents. Its consequences are well
understood. In a model where there is no other friction, an argument similar to that of Prescott
and Townsend (1984) or Allen and Gale (2004) can be used to establish that the ￿rst welfare
theorem holds. The allocations provided by competitive ￿nancial intermediaries are constrained
e¢ cient. Consequently, this ￿rst friction alone does not justify regulating ￿nancial intermediation.
The second friction derives from the limits to the observability of consumption: we assume
that consumers can borrow and lend to each other on a private market by engaging in hidden
side trades.2 Since the contributions of Allen (1985) and Jacklin (1987), the possibility of agents
engaging in hidden side trades has been recognized as an important constraint on risk sharing.3 This
second friction can be interpreted as the case where contracts with ￿nancial intermediaries cannot
be made exclusive. Arguably, both unobservability of certain ￿nancial market transactions and
non-exclusivity are becoming more relevant with the increasing sophistication of ￿nancial markets.
Agents can and do engage in a variety of ￿nancial market transactions and routinely deal with
several di⁄erent intermediaries.
We formalize unobservable trades by considering private markets in which agents can trade after
they are allocated consumption pro￿les by either an intermediary or a social planner. Incentive
1Our results would carry over to the case of investment opportunity shocks a⁄ecting ￿nancially constrained ￿rms.
2A di⁄erent interpretation of this friction is non-exclusivity of contracts.
3The importance of access to credit markets as a constraint on the optimal program was also emphasized in
Chiappori, Macho, Rey, and SalaniØ (1994).
2compatibility together with the possibility of private trades requires the equalization of the present
value of resources given to all agents, discounted at the interest rate prevailing on the private market.
E¢ cient liquidity insurance provision, on the other hand, requires redistribution of resources in the
present value sense at the interest rate equal to the economy￿ s marginal rate of transformation
towards agents with better consumption opportunities ￿those with a higher marginal utility of
income. In the model, this corresponds to agents a⁄ected by a liquidity shock: early consumers.
We ￿rst de￿ne and characterize the competitive equilibrium in the presence of hidden trades.
The competitive equilibrium features limited risk sharing ￿arbitrage among intermediaries makes
the interest rate on the private market and the marginal rate of transformation equal. We con-
tinue to de￿ne and characterize the constrained e¢ cient allocation in the presence of retrading.
By a⁄ecting the total amount of resources available in each period, the social planner can intro-
duce a wedge between the interest rate prevailing on the private market and the marginal rate of
transformation. We show that lowering the interest rate relaxes incentive constraints and improves
risk sharing. The intuition is as follows. The planner wants to allocate a higher present value
of resources ￿discounted at the rate of return on the long term asset ￿to agents a⁄ected by a
liquidity shock. However, the planner is constrained by the possibility that late consumers will
portray themselves as early consumers and save. Lowering the interest rate reduces the return on
such deviations and relaxes incentive compatibility constraints. We then analytically characterize
the optimal interest rate and show that the constrained e¢ cient allocation with retrading coincides
with the constrained e¢ cient allocation without retrading and with the unconstrained ￿￿rst-best￿
solution. For the case of Diamond-Dybvig preferences, the social planner can completely negate the
frictions imposed by retrading and private information and achieve the unconstrained allocation.
This is in stark contrast with the allocation achieved in a competitive equilibrium where the possi-
bility of unobservable trades poses severe constraints on provision of insurance. While the general
point that a government intervention can improve on the allocation in a market system with asym-
metric information is well known,4 a contribution of this paper is to provide a clear understanding
of the rationale and the direction of the required intervention in the context of a widely used and
policy-relevant model.
We propose a simple implementation of the constrained e¢ cient allocation that relies on a
natural regulation imposed on ￿nancial intermediaries in a competitive market. The regulation
takes the form of the imposition of a liquidity ￿ oor that stipulates a minimal portfolio share to be
held in the short term asset by intermediaries. The liquidity ￿ oor increases the amount of the ￿rst
period aggregate resources and drives the interest rate on the private markets down. We show how
the liquidity ￿ oor can be chosen to implement the optimal solution. This simple regulation resembles
the di⁄erent forms of reserve requirements imposed on banks. In practice, reserve requirements were
mostly developed as an answer to di⁄erent concerns pertaining to systemic risk or the fear of bank
runs. According to our analysis, they also contribute to mitigating the ine¢ ciency that we highlight.
The market failure and the required regulation that we consider are novel but are close in spirit
4See Hart (1975), Newbery and Stiglitz (1982) and, for the area of ￿nancial intermediation, Allen and Gale (2004).
3to some arguments that were made in the early stages of ￿nancial regulation during the National
Banking era, as described in a classical study by Sprague (1910) and in a modern exposition by
Chari (1989).
The ￿nal part of the paper extends our characterization of the constrained e¢ cient alloca-
tion and its implementation to more general, smooth preferences. We show that the structure of
Diamond-Dybvig preferences is somewhat special and that the constrained e¢ cient allocations with
and without retrading do not necessarily coincide. We then show that depending on the nature
of liquidity shocks, the optimal interest rate may be higher or lower than that on the competi-
tive markets, and that the optimal implementation may stipulate either a minimal or a maximal
amount of investment in the short term asset. Suppose that agents a⁄ected by liquidity shocks,
i.e., a desire to consume early, also have better lifetime consumption opportunities, i.e., a higher
indirect marginal utility of income. Then the optimal interest rate is lower than the rate of return
on the long term asset and the optimal policy is a liquidity ￿ oor. The opposite holds when agents
hit by a liquidity shock have worse lifetime consumption opportunities.
2 Relation to the literature
This paper builds on a large literature on ￿nancial intermediation (Diamond and Dybvig 1983,
Jacklin 1987, Bhattacharya and Gale 1987, Hellwig 1994, Diamond 1997, Von Thadden 1999,
Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2003, Allen and Gale 2003, 20045). More generally, our paper ￿ts in
the literature of optimal allocations with unobservable taste shocks following Atkeson and Lucas
(1992).
Our paper is closely related to Jacklin (1987). That paper compares a competitive equilibrium
with private markets to the social optimum without private markets and reaches the conclusion
that the prohibition of private markets leads to a Pareto improvement. In our paper, we solve a
planning problem with both unobservable types and private markets. In contrast with Jacklin, we
do not prohibit private markets to achieve superior or even unconstrained allocations.
Our paper uses the mechanism design framework and the language of Allen and Gale (2004)
to analyze the model of intermediation in the presence of private markets. Our paper shares a
common goal with the work of Allen and Gale (2004) in studying whether laissez-faire markets
provide and allocate liquidity e¢ ciently. Both papers direct regulation at intermediaries rather
than individual consumers. However, we focus on a di⁄erent mechanism. The result of Allen and
Gale (2004) that their equilibrium is ine¢ cient relies on the exogenously imposed incompleteness
of markets for trades among intermediaries when there are aggregate shocks. In the absence of
incomplete markets for aggregate shocks or in the absence of aggregate shocks, Allen and Gale
(2004) conclude that there is no role for regulation. By showing how the planner can manipulate
the interest rate on the private markets, we demonstrate that a liquidity requirement can improve
upon the competitive equilibrium even when there are incomplete markets for insurance against
5For an excellent survey of the literature see Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Gorton and Winton (2002).
4aggregate shocks or when there are no aggregate shocks. The characterization of the mechanism
through which liquidity requirements a⁄ect interest rates and improve upon the market allocation
is new to the banking literature.
Holmstr￿m and Tirole (1998) provide a theory of liquidity in a model in which intermediaries
face borrowing constraints. In their model, a government has an advantage over private markets as
it can enforce repayments of borrowed funds while the private lenders cannot. They maintain the
assumption of complete markets and show that the availability of government-provided liquidity
leads to a Pareto improvement when there is aggregate uncertainty. Lorenzoni (2006) considers a
Diamond-Dybvig model of banking with ￿nancial markets. His results on the characterization of
the optimum are similar to our results for the special case of Diamond-Dybvig setup. However,
he maintains a focus on monetary models. Another paper related to our results in the Diamond-
Dybvig setup is Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004). They develop a model of emerging market
￿nancial crises in which there is a market for external borrowing and a domestic private market.
The domestic market in their model is similar to the private market in our formulation. They show
that the equilibrium coincides with the optimal allocation in the presence of private markets. They
further show that a range of ￿nancial instruments including liquidity requirements and taxes on
external borrowing can implement the optimal allocation.
While the focus of this paper is ￿nancial intermediation, we also contribute to the literature
on optimal policy in the presence of hidden trades.6 In particular, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007)
study an optimal dynamic Mirrlees taxation model with endogenous private markets. There are
two main di⁄erences between our paper and their work. The ￿rst di⁄erence is in the nature of
the shocks. In Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) as in most of models of dynamic taxation (see, e.g.,
Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski 2003, Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning 2006, Kocherlakota
2006, and Farhi and Werning 2007), private information (skill shocks) is dynamic and separable
from consumption.7 In our setup, shocks a⁄ect the marginal rate of substitution for consumption
and the marginal utility of income. The second di⁄erence pertains to the strength of the results
that we obtain. Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) and Bisin et. al. (2001) are able to identify only the
direction of a local policy change that leads to a Pareto improvement. We characterize the globally
optimal allocation in the presence of private markets and show that optimal liquidity regulation
implements the constrained optimum.
In Diamond (1997), as in our paper, there is more risk sharing among agents of di⁄erent types
than in Jacklin (1987). His result relies on the assumption that some consumers are exogenously
restricted from participating in private markets. Unlike that paper, in our model all consumers can
participate in markets. An elegant paper by Bisin and Rampini (2006) justi￿es the institution of
bankruptcy in a model of non-exclusive contracts. In their work, borrowers (entrepreneurs) have
6See, for example, Arnott and Stiglitz (1986, 1990), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), and Hammond (1987). Several
recent papers such as Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Bisin et al. (2001) showed, in very general settings,
that economies with asymmetric information are ine¢ cient, and argued for Pareto-improving anonymous taxes.
7See also Albanesi (2006) for a model of entrepreneurship and ￿nancial assets which has elements of unobservable
trades.
5access to secondary markets. A possibility of default on these secondary contracts decreases returns
to hidden borrowing and lending and yields a Pareto improvement.
One justi￿cation for reserve requirements in the literature is found in the existence of deposit
insurance. The usually given rationale is as follows: deposit insurance encourages risk taking be-
havior of intermediaries (see, e.g., Merton 1977) which can be controlled by requiring intermediaries
to hold adequate levels of liquidity. In this argument, the existence of one potentially suboptimal
policy, deposit insurance, justi￿es another policy ￿reserve requirements. Typically, however, this
literature does not derive deposit insurance as an optimal policy in response to a speci￿ed market
failure. Moreover, with the exception of Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), the literature does
not consider optimal policy in the absence of deposit insurance.
3 Model
We consider a standard model of ￿nancial intermediation similar to Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
and to Allen and Gale (2004). The economy lasts three periods, t = 0;1;2. There are two assets
(technologies) in the model. The short asset is a storage technology that returns one unit of
consumption good at t + 1 for each unit invested at t. Investment in the long asset has to be done
at t = 0 to yield ^ R > 1 units of the consumption good at t = 2. Therefore, the time interval from
t = 0 to t = 2 in this model is interpreted, as in the Diamond-Dybvig model, as the time it takes
to costlessly liquidate the long-term asset.
The economy is populated by a unit continuum of ex-ante identical agents, or investors. Suppose
there are two types of agents denoted by ￿ 2 f0;1g. At t = 0, all individuals are (ex-ante) identical
and receive an endowment e. At t = 1, each consumer gets a draw of his type. With probability
￿ 2 (0;1) he is an agent of type ￿ = 0, and with probability (1 ￿ ￿) he is an agent of type
￿ = 1; the fraction of agents of each type is therefore ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿, respectively. We introduce
the ￿baseline￿utility function u : R+ ! R and assume that it is twice continuously di⁄erentiable,
increasing, strictly concave, and satis￿es Inada conditions u0(0) = +1 and u0(+1) = 0. In
terms of the baseline function u, preferences of an agent of type ￿ are given by utility function
U : R+ ￿ R+ ￿ f0;1g ! R, which is assumed to take the form
U(c1;c2;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)u(c1) + ￿￿u(c1 + c2),
where c1 is agent￿ s consumption in period 1, c2 is agent￿ s consumption in period 2, and ￿ is a
constant which is the same for agents of both types. In addition, we assume, as in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is everywhere greater than or equal to
1:
￿cu00(c)
u0(c)
￿ 1 for all c > 0, (1)
and that ^ R￿1 < ￿ < 1 (which implies ￿ ^ R > 1).
Agents of type ￿ = 0 are a⁄ected by liquidity shocks, and value consumption in the ￿rst period
6only. Agents of type ￿ = 1 are indi⁄erent between consuming in the ￿rst and the second period.
We use these preferences throughout the main body of the paper and, in the the last section,
consider a more general class of preferences that demonstrate the somewhat speci￿c properties of
the Diamond-Dybvig setup.
A key informational friction is that types of agents are private, i.e., observable only by the agent
himself but not by others.
We denote by fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g an allocation of consumption across consumers. An alloca-
tion is feasible if it satis￿es:
￿
￿
c1 (0) +
c2 (0)
^ R
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
c1 (1) +
c2 (1)
^ R
￿
￿ e: (2)
We do not impose a sequential service constraint so there are no bank runs in our model. We
also restrict our attention to pure strategies and consider symmetric equilibria (i.e., those in which
the strategy of all agents of the same type is the same).
4 Benchmark environment without private markets
In this section, we de￿ne and characterize a benchmark economy in which the only friction is
unobservability of types. In this environment, agents are given consumption allocations depending
on their types. Agents cannot engage in any unobservable transaction, and their consumption is
therefore observable.
We start by de￿ning a constrained e¢ cient program, i.e., the problem of the social planner,
which we call problem SP2 or a ￿second best￿problem:
max
fc1(￿);c2(￿)g￿2f0;1g
￿u(c1(0)) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿u(c1(1) + c2(1)) (3)
s.t.
￿
￿
c1(0) +
c2(0)
^ R
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
c1(1) +
c2(1)
^ R
￿
￿ e; (4)
u(c1(0)) ￿ u(c1(1)); (5)
u(c1(1) + c2(1)) ￿ u(c1(0) + c2(0)): (6)
The planner maximizes expected utility of an agent subject to the feasibility constraint (4) and
two incentive compatibility constraints. Constraint (5) ensures that an agent of type ￿ = 0 does
not want to pretend to be an agent of type ￿ = 1. Constraint (6) ensures that an agent of type
￿ = 1 does not want to pretend to be an agent of type ￿ = 0.
We can also de￿ne an unconstrained optimum that we call SP1 in which there is no private
information ￿the ￿￿rst best￿program. That program di⁄ers from the problem SP2 in that the
incentive compatibility constraints (5) and (6) are omitted.
As noted by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the incentive compatibility constraints are not binding
7at the optimum of (3). In other words, solutions to problems SP1 and SP2 coincide. The following
Theorem establishes this formally.
Theorem 1 Solutions to problems SP1 and SP2 coincide, and are fully characterized by
c2(0) = c1(1) = 0; (7)
u0 (c1 (0)) = ￿ ^ Ru0 (c2 (1)); (8)
￿c1(0) + (1 ￿ ￿)
c2(1)
^ R
= e: (9)
Moreover, c1 (0) > e and c2 (1) < ^ Re.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The planner redistributes resources to consumers of type ￿ = 0 who are given a higher present
value of consumption than the value of their endowment. Late consumers, those with ￿ = 1, receive
consumption that is less than the present value of their endowment.
We can also de￿ne a competitive equilibrium problem in which there is a continuum of inter-
mediaries providing insurance to agents. The intermediaries are subject to the same constraint
as the social planner and do not observe the types of agents. We omit a formal de￿nition here.
Note however that a version of the ￿rst welfare theorem would hold here as shown by Prescott and
Townsend (1984) and Allen and Gale (2004): the competitive equilibrium allocations would coincide
with the solution to the problem SP2. The key to this result is that consumption is observable ￿
agents cannot engage in unobservable trades.
5 Private markets
The allocations described in the previous section may not be achieved if agents can engage in private
transactions. Allen (1985) and Jacklin (1987) were the ￿rst to point out that the possibility of such
trades may restrict risk sharing across agents. In this section, we ￿rst formally describe how to
model unobservable consumption. This formalization will be central to de￿ning and characterizing
both competitive equilibria and constrained e¢ cient allocations with private markets.
Consider an environment in which all consumers have access to a market in which they can trade
assets among themselves unobservably.8 Formally, suppose that consumers are o⁄ered a menu of
contracts fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g. A consumer treats the contract and the equilibrium interest rate
R on the private market as given and chooses his optimal reporting strategy ￿0 that determines his
endowment of consumption
￿
c1
￿
￿0￿
;c2
￿
￿0￿￿
. Unlike in the environment without private markets,
8All our analysis is easily extended to the case in which agents can trade not only among themselves but also with
other intermediaries. This case would bring this model closer to an interpretation as an environment of non-exclusive
contracts. A key assumption that allows us to extend our results to that case is that portfolios of the intermediaries
(investment in short and long assets) are observable while transactions with individual consumers are not. Our choice
of modeling side trades as private markets allows us to economize on notation without a⁄ecting the substance of the
results.
8the actual after-trade consumption (x1;x2) may di⁄er from the consumption speci￿ed in the con-
tract, since it is impossible to preclude a consumer from borrowing and lending a certain amount
s on the private market.9 Given a menu of consumption allocations fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g and an
interest rate R, an agent of type ￿ solves:
~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿) = max
x1;x2;s;￿0 U (x1;x2;￿); (10)
subject to:
x1 + s = c1
￿
￿0￿
; (11)
x2 = c2
￿
￿0￿
+ Rs: (12)
In what follows, we de￿ne x1(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿); x2(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿);
s(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿); ￿0(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿) as a solution to problem (10).
We now formally de￿ne an equilibrium in the private market.
De￿nition 1 An equilibrium in the private market given the pro￿le of endowments fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g
consists of interest rate R and, for each agent of type ￿: allocations x1(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿);
x2(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿); trades s(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿); and choices of reported types
￿0(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿) such that
(i) x1(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿); x2(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿); s(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿);
￿0(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿) constitute a solution to problem (10);
(ii) the feasibility constraints on the private market are satis￿ed for 8t = 1;2:
￿xt(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;0) + (1 ￿ ￿)xt(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;1) (13)
￿ ￿ct
￿
￿0(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;0)
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)ct
￿
￿0(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;1)
￿
:
6 Competitive equilibrium with private markets CE3
In this section, we formally describe competitive equilibria and show how risk sharing is hindered
by the possibility of agents engaging in unobservable trades in private markets.
Consider a market with a continuum of intermediaries. We assume throughout the paper
that all activities at the intermediary level are observable. In period 0, before the realization
of idiosyncratic shocks, consumers deposit their initial endowment with an intermediary. The
intermediary provides a menu of consumption allocations fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g. In the presence
of private markets, intermediaries need to take into account, in addition to unobservable types,
that consumers are able to engage in transactions in the private market. Contracts are o⁄ered
competitively, and there is free entry for intermediaries. Therefore, each consumers sign a contract
with the intermediary who promises the highest ex-ante expected utility. We denote the equilibrium
utility of a consumer by U.
9It can be shown that a consumer trades only a risk free security (Golosov and Tsyvinski 2007).
9We assume that intermediaries can trade bonds b among themselves. Without aggregate uncer-
tainty the market for these trades is very simple. We denote by q the price of a bond b in period
t = 1 that pays one unit of consumption good in period 2. All intermediaries take this price as
given. They also pay dividends d1; d2 to its owners.10
It is important to note that intermediaries take the interest rate on the private market R as
given. The maximization problem of the intermediary that faces intertemporal price q, interest
rate on the private market R, and reservation utility of consumers U is
max
fc1(￿);c2(￿)g￿2f0;1g;(d1;d2);b
d1 +
d2
^ R
+ qb ￿
b
^ R
(14)
s.t.
￿
￿
c1(0) +
c2(0)
^ R
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
c1(1) +
c2(1)
^ R
￿
+ d1 +
d2
^ R
+ qb ￿
b
^ R
￿ e; (15)
￿ = ￿0(fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿); 8￿; (16)
￿~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;0) + (1 ￿ ￿) ~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;1) ￿ U : (17)
The ￿rst constraint in the intermediary￿ s problem is the budget constraint. The second con-
straint is incentive compatibility that states that, given the pro￿le of consumptions fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g
and the possibility to borrow or lend at an interest rate R, consumers choose to truthfully reveal
their types, i.e. the true type ￿ is a solution to the problem (10); we can restrict the interme-
diaries to truth-telling mechanisms because the Revelation Principle applies. The last constraint
states that the intermediary cannot o⁄er a contract which delivers a lower expected utility than
the equilibrium utility U from the contracts o⁄ered by other intermediaries. In equilibrium, all
intermediaries act identically and make zero pro￿ts. The de￿nition of the competitive equilibrium
is then as follows.
De￿nition 2 A competitive equilibrium with private markets, CE3, is a set of allocations fc￿
1 (￿);c￿
2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g;
a price q￿, dividends fd￿
1;d￿
2g; bond trades b￿, utility U￿, and the interest rate on the private market
R￿ such that
(i) each intermediary chooses ffc￿
1 (￿);c￿
2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g;fd￿
1;d￿
2g;b￿g to solve problem (14) taking
q￿; R￿; and U￿ as given;
(ii) consumers choose the contract of an intermediary that o⁄ers them the highest ex-ante utility;
(iii) the aggregate feasibility constraint (2) holds;
(iv) the private market, given the menus fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g, is in an equilibrium of De￿nition
1, and R is an equilibrium interest rate on the private market;
(v) intermediaries make zero pro￿ts;
(vi) bond markets clear: b = 0.
It is easy to see that the interest rate on the markets for trades among intermediaries must be
10Since intermediaries make zero pro￿ts in equilibrum, we do not formally specify how these dividends are distrib-
uted.
10equal to the return on the production technology, so that 1=q = ^ R. We now present a lemma that
shows that the incentive compatibility constraints (16) can be expressed in a simple form: the net
present value of resources allocated to each type must be equalized when discounted at the market
interest rate R. The proof is simple. If the present values are not equated across types, an agent
would pretend to claim a type that gives a higher present value of allocations and engage in trades
on the private markets to achieve its desired consumption allocation.
Lemma 1 An allocation satis￿es the incentive compatibility constraint (16) if and only if
c1 (0) +
c2 (0)
R
= c1 (1) +
c2 (1)
R
. (18)
Proof. In text above.
Let us rewrite the problem of the intermediary in a more tractable form by considering its dual,
simplifying the incentive compatibility constraint using Lemma 1 and the fact that d1+ d2
^ R = 0 and
b = 0, since we are interested in symmetric allocations only:
max
fc1(￿);c2(￿)g￿2f0;1g
￿~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;0) + (1 ￿ ￿)~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;1); (19)
s.t. (18) and
￿
￿
c1(0) +
c2(0)
^ R
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
c1(1) +
c2(1)
^ R
￿
￿ e: (20)
We now argue that R = ^ R; otherwise, arbitrage opportunities are created. For example, suppose
that R < ^ R, i.e. the interest rate on the private market is lower than ^ R. An intermediary
then chooses to invest only in the long asset (and therefore only o⁄ers contracts paying ￿c2(0) +
(1 ￿ ￿)c2 (1) = ^ Re in period t = 2) and sets investment in the short asset to be equal to zero
(paying ￿c1(0) + (1 ￿ ￿)c1 (1) = 0 in period t = 1). Since consumers care only about the present
value of the contract because private market exists, they will buy this contract. In period t = 1,
after the types are realized, agents of type ￿ = 0 would borrow on the private market at the interest
rate R while agents of type ￿ = 1 would not be able to supply ￿rst period good. Hence, the market
clearing condition would not hold, and we conclude that that R < ^ R cannot be an equilibrium
interest rate. Analogously, we rule out R > ^ R. The only candidate equilibrium interest rate is
R = ^ R so that intermediaries do not engage in arbitrage.
At interest rate ^ R, the intermediary is indi⁄erent between investing in short asset and long
asset. However, since ^ R > 1, consumers of type ￿ = 1 would only demand second period goods on
the private market, while consumers of type ￿ = 0 would demand ￿rst period goods only. Incentive
compatibility, given Lemma 1 with R = ^ R, implies that competing intermediaries would deliver
goods of present value e to each of consumers. Consequently, market clearing condition requires
that there are ￿e units of ￿rst period good and (1 ￿ ￿) ^ Re units of second period good available on
the market; consumers with ￿ = 0 consume ￿rst period goods only while consumers ￿ = 1 consume
second period ones. We summarize this reasoning in the following proposition.
11Proposition 1 Let R￿ denote equilibrium price on the private market corresponding to the com-
petitive equilibrium in De￿nition 2. Then R￿ = ^ R: Moreover,
c1(1) = e; c2(0) = 0;
c1(1) = 0; c2 (1) = ^ Re:
Proof. In text above.
This proposition states that risk sharing is severely limited in a competitive equilibrium with
side trades. Arbitrage among competing intermediaries forces the equilibrium interest rate on the
private market to be equal to the return on the long run asset ^ R. Then, as in Jacklin (1987) and
Allen and Gale (2004), the present values of consumption entitlements (evaluated at ^ R) are equated
across consumers of di⁄erent types:
c1 (0) +
c2 (0)
^ R
= c1 (1) +
c2 (1)
^ R
.
7 Constrained e¢ cient allocation with private markets
In this section, we de￿ne and characterize the constrained e¢ cient problem with private markets.
We call the program SP3 or the ￿third best￿program. Consider a social planner that cannot ob-
serve or shut down trades on private markets and cannot observe agents￿types. The di⁄erence with
the problem SP2 is that, in addition to the private information faced by SP2, planner SP3 faces
constraints that agents may trade on the private market. The social planner SP3 chooses the alloca-
tion fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g that maximizes the ex ante utility of consumers. The revelation principle
shows that, without loss of generality, the social planner can o⁄er a contract fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g
so that all consumers choose to report their types truthfully to the planner and not to trade on the
private market.
Formally, the constrained e¢ cient allocation fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g is the solution to the problem
SP3 given by:
max
fc1(￿);c2(￿)g￿2f0;1g
￿U (c1 (0);c2 (0);0) + (1 ￿ ￿)U (c1 (1);c2 (1);1); (21)
s.t.
￿
￿
c1 (0) +
c2 (0)
^ R
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
c1 (1) +
c2 (1)
^ R
￿
￿ e; (22)
U (c1 (￿);c2 (￿);￿) ￿ ~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R;￿) 8￿; (23)
where R is an equilibrium interest rate on the private market, given the pro￿le of endowments
fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g according to De￿nition 1.
We now show that choosing consumption allocations in the constrained e¢ cient problem (21)
is equivalent to the problem of a planner choosing an interest rate R on the private market and
12allocating the same income (present value of consumption allocations) I to agents of di⁄erent types.
The planner can introduce a wedge between the interest rate R on the private market and the rate
of return on the long run asset ^ R. The incentive compatibility constraint again presents itself as a
requirement that the same present value of resources I is allocated across agents of di⁄erent types.
Therefore, the planner e⁄ectively has only two instruments: an income I and an interest rate R.
Formally, we proceed as follows. Let:
V (I;R;￿) = max
x1;x2
U(x1;x2;￿) (24)
subject to
x1 +
x2
R
￿ I, (25)
be the ex post indirect utility of an agent of type ￿ if her income is I, and the interest rate on the
private market is R. Denote the solutions to this problem (uncompensated demands) by xu
1(I;R;￿)
and xu
2(I;R;￿).
Consider the problem of a social planner who chooses the interest rate R and income I to
maximize the expected indirect utility of agents subject to feasibility constraints.
max
I;R
￿V (I;R;0) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (I;R;1) (26)
subject to
￿
￿
xu
1(I;R;0) +
xu
2(I;R;0)
^ R
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
xu
1(I;R;1) +
xu
2(I;R;1)
^ R
￿
￿ e; (27)
where xu
1(I;R;￿);xu
2(I;R;￿) are de￿ned above as solutions to (24).
We now prove the equivalence of the problem (21) and the problem (26).
Lemma 2 Let I￿ and R￿ be solutions to (26), and fxu
1(I￿;R￿;￿);xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)g￿2f0;1g be solutions
to (24) given I￿ and R￿. Then fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g de￿ned by
ct (￿) = xu
t (I￿;R￿;￿); 8￿ 2 f0;1g 8t 2 f1;2g (28)
are solutions to problem (21). Conversely, if fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g solves problem (21), then there
exist I￿ and R￿ which solve (26) if fxu
1(I￿;R￿;￿);xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)g￿2f0;1g are given by (28), and such
that fxu
1(I￿;R￿;￿);xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)g￿2f0;1g solve (24) for I = I￿ and R = R￿.
Proof. In the appendix.
The above lemma reduces the dimensionality of the problem. The planner chooses only two
variables: the interest rate R and income I. Using this lemma, we can now provide a characterization
of the constrained e¢ cient allocation.
13Theorem 2 Solutions to the constrained e¢ cient problem with private markets, SP3, constrained
e¢ cient problem without private markets, SP2, and informationally unconstrained problem, SP1,
coincide. Moreover, the interest rate R￿ on the private market corresponding to the solution of SP3
is such that R￿ 2 (1;￿ ^ R]. If u(c) = log(c), then R￿ = ￿ ^ R.
Proof. In the appendix.
This theorem is one of the central results of the paper: a social planner, even in the presence
of hidden trades, can achieve allocations superior to the ones achieved by competitive markets.
Moreover, we fully characterize the constrained e¢ cient allocation and show that for the case of
Diamond-Dybvig preferences, it coincides with the unconstrained, full information optimum, SP1.
The intuition for the result is that lowering the interest rate relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraints. Consider a relevant deviation in the model. An agent of type ￿ = 1 wants to claim to
be an agent of type ￿ = 0 and then save the allocation c1 (0) at the private market interest rate
R￿. An interest rate on the private markets R￿ < ^ R reduces the pro￿tability of this deviation.
In the case of Diamond-Dybvig preferences, lowering the interest rates allows perfect screening
of the di⁄erent types and achieves not only the constrained e¢ cient allocation SP3 but also the
unconstrained optimum SP1. Note that the manipulation of the equilibrium interest rate by the
planner is indirect and happens through the general equilibrium e⁄ect of changing the pro￿le of
endowments. The planner can increase the amount of investment in the short asset (amount of
allocations paid in the ￿rst period) and correspondingly reduce the amount of investment in the long
asset (amount of allocations paid in the second period). Lemma 2 showed that such a manipulation
of endowments induces the desired change of the interest rate in the private market.
More generally, lowering the interest rate bene￿ts agents who value consumption in the ￿rst
period more. If these agents also have a higher marginal utility of income ￿as is the case for
Diamond-Dybvig preferences ￿this leads to an improvement in the provision of liquidity insurance
and in the ex ante welfare. Recall that the unobservability of agents￿types and possibility of trades
require that agents of various types receive the same present value of consumption evaluated at the
private market interest rate R:
c1 (0) +
c2 (0)
R
= c1 (1) +
c2 (1)
R
.
However, the amount of resources evaluated at the real rate of return may di⁄er across agents
c1 (￿) +
c2 (￿)
^ R
6= c1
￿
￿0￿
+
c2
￿
￿0￿
^ R
:
In our case, the change in the interest rate transfer resources to the agent ￿ = 0 a⁄ected by a
liquidity shock, who is marginally more valuable to the regulator.
What can we conclude from Theorem 2? Intermediaries in the competitive equilibrium provide
limited risk sharing. The planner can improve upon the competitive equilibrium and in fact achieve
the unconstrained optimum. In the next section we show how the imposition of a simple regulation
14on ￿nancial intermediaries in a competitive equilibrium can implement the constrained e¢ cient
allocation.
8 Implementing constrained e¢ cient allocations ￿ liquidity re-
quirements
In this section we show that there exists an intervention ￿a liquidity ￿oor ￿that implements the
constrained e¢ cient allocation SP3.
A liquidity requirement is a constraint imposed on all intermediaries, i.e., a constraint on the
problem (14) that requires that investment in the short asset (payments to the consumers in the
￿rst period) for any intermediary should be higher than a level i
￿c1 (0) + (1 ￿ ￿)c1 (1) ￿ i: (29)
An attractive feature of a liquidity requirements is that it does not require a regulator to observe
individual contracts c1 (￿) ￿only the aggregate portfolio allocation of the intermediaries needs to
be observed.
We now intuitively describe the e⁄ects that a binding liquidity requirement has on the interest
rate on private markets. Let ^ X be the investment in the short asset that arises in a competitive
equilibrium as in De￿nition 2. Suppose that a liquidity ￿ oor i is set higher than the amount of the
￿rst period claims provided by competitive markets:
i ￿ ^ X:
When a liquidity ￿ oor is imposed, the aggregate endowment in the ￿rst period is equal to i rather
than ^ X. Private trading markets in which agents participate after receiving their allocation from the
intermediaries are an exchange economy: at the aggregate level, no resources can be transferred at
this stage from one period to the next. The liquidity ￿ oor increases the aggregate endowment of the
￿rst period good in the private market (and, correspondingly, decreases the aggregate endowment
of the second period good) and, therefore, has a general equilibrium e⁄ect in indirectly lowering
the interest rate R below ^ R.
In the absence of regulations, the interest rate R on the private market is equal to ^ R. As we
showed in Proposition 1, any di⁄erence between R and ^ R would be arbitraged away by intermedi-
aries. Imposing a liquidity ￿ oor lowers the interest rate and implements the constrained e¢ cient
allocation by putting a limits on this arbitrage.
Proposition 2 Let the liquidity ￿oor i￿ de￿ned in (29) be given by
i￿ = ￿I￿; (30)
15where I￿ is the solution to (26). Then competitive equilibrium allocation speci￿ed in De￿nition 2
with the imposed liquidity ￿oor (formally, an additional constraint (29)) coincides with the con-
strained e¢ cient allocation SP3.
Proof. In the Appendix
This proposition is important as it speci￿es a simple regulation that implements the optimum.
Note that this regulation does not prohibit private markets. Rather, it a⁄ects the investments and
holding of assets by ￿nancial intermediaries. In general, deriving implementations of constrained
e¢ cient allocations is a di¢ cult task in environments where private trades are possible. An abstract
treatment of a related problem is given in Bisin et al. (2001) who show that, in a general class of
environments with anonymous markets, taxes can achieve Pareto improvements. The di⁄erence
with our setup is that they do not de￿ne the constrained e¢ cient problem SP3 but rather show
that a local linear tax can improve upon the market allocation. Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007)
study a dynamic model of optimal taxation and de￿ne the optimal program similar to our SP3.
They also show that a linear tax on savings may locally improve upon the competitive equilibrium
allocation.
9 Some historical background
In this section we argue that some elements of our model can be connected to the debates that
were taking place in the period of the National Banking System in the United States (1863-1913).
We follow the discussion of the classic work by Sprague (1910a, 1910b) and the modern exposition
and interpretation by Chari (1998). Sprague and Chari are mostly interested in banking crises
and panics while we focus on liquidity provision more generally. However, some of their arguments
identify frictions that resemble the ones that we are emphasizing.
The National Banking System of reserves was a three-tier structure: regional banks (the ￿rst
tier), designated banks in reserve cities (the second tier), and designated banks in New York City
(the third tier). The di⁄erent tiers of the banking system were subject to di⁄erent reserve require-
ments. Banks in the ￿rst and second tiers could decide whether to hold their reserves in cash or
to deposit them in institutions of the upper tier. As a result, lower tier banks had an incentive to
deposit their reserves in New York City banks rather than holding liquid assets or cash. In e⁄ect,
the reserves of the lower tier banks deposited in New York City were loans and did not contribute
to the overall amount of reserves in the system.
At the time, the demand for withdrawals ￿ uctuated with the quality of the crops and was
hard to predict. In other words, liquidity shocks were prevalent. The National Banking System
experienced several major banking crises. Many commentators argued that these crises were in
part due to the insu¢ cient amount of aggregate reserves in the form liquid assets set aside by the
￿nancial system. Sprague (1910a, pp. 96-97), commenting on the crisis of 1873, wrote that ￿The
aggregate [reserves] held by all national banks of the United States does not ￿nally much exceed 10
per cent of their direct liabilities.￿This amount was much lower than the statutory requirement.
16The blame was put on the practice of paying interest on the reserves deposited to the New
York City banks. Sprague writes ￿But this practice of paying interest on bankers￿deposits, as it
now obtains, has other and more far-reaching consequences. It is an important cause of the failure
to maintain a reserve of lending power in periods of business activity and the fundamental cause
of the failure￿ (1910b) and ￿The abandonment of the practice of paying interest upon deposits
will remove a great inducement to divide ... reserves between cash in hand and deposits in cities￿
(Sprague 1910a, p. 97). In other words, interest rates on reserves in New York banks were too
high, crowding out liquid assets.11
In response to the crisis of 1873, the New York Clearing House Association was created. Its main
purpose was to improve the allocation of liquidity by allowing banks to draw on each other￿ s reserves.
However, ￿nancial innovation progressively undermined the role of the Clearing House Association.
In particular, the rise of trust companies in the beginning of 1900s contributed signi￿cantly to the
severe crisis of 1907 (Moen and Tallman 1992). The trust companies accounted for a signi￿cant
amount of assets ￿nearly as much as banks ￿and had very small reserve requirements: they did not
fall under the banking regulations and were not part of the New York Clearing House Association.
These trusts, however, were engaged in signi￿cant transactions with the banks that were members of
the Association, and member banks often used trusts to circumvent reserve requirements (Sprague,
1910a, p.227).
These episodes illustrate several features of ￿nancial intermediation that are also at play in
our model. First, aggregate liquidity ￿and not only concerns about the liquidity or solvency of
any particular individual intermediary ￿matters. Second, high interest rates ine¢ ciently divert
resources from low-return liquid assets. Finally, side trades and ￿nancial innovation can severely
undermine ￿nancial regulations. A lesson for our times is that an e¢ cient regulation should have
a wide scope and cover a variety of ￿nancial institutions ￿for example, mutual funds and hedge
funds.
10 General preferences
The analysis of the previous sections characterized constrained e¢ cient allocations in the presence
of private markets and showed that a liquidity ￿ oor implements the optimal allocation in the case
of Diamond-Dybvig preferences. Moreover, the constrained e¢ cient allocations with and without
private markets coincide. In this section, we consider a more general speci￿cation of preferences.
We show that the form of preferences matters for the form of the optimal regulation. Also, the
ability of agents to engage in trades may lead to constrained e¢ cient allocations inferior to those
without trades. We then provide an analytical characterization of this more general model.
11See also the address of George S. Coe, a prominent ￿nancier of that time, to the New York Clearing House
Association discussing why individual banks have an incentive to underinvest in the assets with short term maturity
(Sprague 1910a, pp. 377-378).
1710.1 Setup
In this section, we consider a more general model of ￿nancial intermediation. There is now a
continuum of possible types. We denote the preference shock by ￿ 2 ￿ = [￿L;￿H] ￿ [0;1], where
￿L < ￿H. At t = 1, each consumer gets an i.i.d. draw of his type from a distribution with c.d.f.
F(￿). We assume that the ￿law of large numbers￿holds, and that the cross-sectional distribution
of types is the same as the probability distribution F. One can, therefore, interpret F(￿) as the
share of agents with types below ￿. Investors￿preferences are represented by a utility function
u(c1;c2;￿), where ct denotes consumption at date t = 1, 2. The utility function u(￿;￿;￿) is assumed
to be concave, increasing, and continuous for every type ￿. We also assume the following single
crossing property.
Assumption 1 (Single crossing): @
@￿
￿
@u=@c2
@u=@c1
￿
> 0.
Speci￿cally, we focus on three types of preferences which we use to study discount factor shocks,
liquidity shocks, and valuation-neutral shocks. Let ^ u(￿) be concave, increasing, and continuous.
Example 1 Discount factor shocks: u(c1;c2;￿) = ^ u(c1) + ￿^ u(c2):
The ￿rst feature of these preferences is that an agent with a higher ￿ shock has a higher marginal
utility of consumption in the second period. The second feature of these preferences is that an agent
with higher ￿ has higher lifetime marginal utility of income.
Example 2 Liquidity shocks: u(c1;c2;￿) =
1
￿
^ u(c1) + ^ u(c2):
In this case, a low ￿ shock increases marginal utility of consumption in the ￿rst period. The
second feature of these preferences is that an agent with lower ￿ has a higher lifetime marginal utility
of income than an agent with higher ￿.12 These preferences are a straightforward generalization of
the Diamond-Dybvig setup.
Example 3 Valuation-neutral shocks: Let ^ u(c) =
c1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
and
u(c1;c2;￿) =
1 ￿ ￿
￿
￿1=￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
1=￿ ^ R
1￿￿
￿
￿￿ ^ u(c1) +
￿
￿
￿1=￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
1=￿ ^ R
1￿￿
￿
￿￿ ^ u(c2): (31)
If ^ u(c) = log(c), then
u(c1;c2;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ u(c1) + ￿^ u(c2):
12A natural question arises whether uility speci￿cation of liquidity shocks
1
￿
^ u(c1) + ^ u(c2) is a renormalization of
the discount shocks ^ u(c1) + ￿^ u(c2), and that by dividing utility in the case of discount shocks by ￿ we would arrive
to the model with liquidity shocks. It is true that both of preferences have the same marginal rates of substitution.
However, the preferences are di⁄erent in the direction of marginal utility of income. In the case of liquidity shocks,
it is low ￿ that gives an agent a higher marginal utility of income. In the case of discount factor shocks, it is exactly
the opposite ￿higher ￿ leads to higher lifetime marginal utility of income.
18In this case, agents di⁄er in marginal utility of consumption across periods, but all agents have
the same marginal value of income. Note that in the case of the log utility, there is no need to
normalize preferences by ^ R, and valuation-neutral preferences do not depend on technology.
10.2 Characterization
Many of the de￿nitions and results of the previous sections immediately apply in this generalized
setup. We omit the formalism for the cases where results derived above directly generalize. We refer
the reader to the working paper version for the more detailed analysis. Speci￿cally, the de￿nition of
the equilibrium in private markets given by De￿nition 1 immediately extends to this section. Let R
be the interest rate on the private market. The analysis of the competitive equilibrium with private
markets in this environment is a direct extension of De￿nition 2. As in Proposition 1, we conclude
that in a competitive equilibrium, redistribution is limited, as the present values of consumption
allocations are equated for all consumers at the interest rate ^ R.
We can now extend the de￿nition of the constrained e¢ cient problem with private markets,
SP3 :
max
fc1(￿);c2(￿)g￿2￿
Z
￿
u(c1 (￿);c2 (￿);￿)dF (￿); (32)
s.t. Z
￿
￿
c1 (￿) +
c2 (￿)
^ R
￿
dF (￿) ￿ e; (33)
u(c1 (￿);c2 (￿);￿) ￿ ~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2￿ ;R;￿);8￿;￿0; (34)
where R constitutes an equilibrium on the private market, given the pro￿le of endowments fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2￿
(the corresponding problem of a consumer of type ￿, which de￿nes ~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2￿ ;R;￿), is
the same as (10)).
As a next step we de￿ne a relevant notion of liquidity requirement. Here, it is more general and
can take the form of either a liquidity ￿ oor or a liquidity cap. Formally, a liquidity requirement is
a constraint imposed on all intermediaries, that requires that investment in the short asset for any
intermediary should be higher (lower) than a certain level i:13
￿Z
￿
c1 (￿)dF (￿)
￿
￿
￿
i: (35)
We call a liquidity requirement a liquidity cap if (35) is imposed with a less than or equal to
sign. A liquidity cap stipulates the maximal amount of the short asset that an intermediary can
hold. We call a liquidity requirement a liquidity ￿oor if (35) is imposed with a greater or equal
sign.
We introduce the following notation. First, xc
t(V (I;R;￿);R;￿) denotes the compensated de-
mand of agents of type ￿ in period t 2 f1;2g which solves problem (24). We use I and R indices
13Formally, we de￿ne a problem that is a generalization of the problem of an intermediary (14) and impose the
liquidity requirement as an additional constraint as we did for Proposition 2.
19to denote partial derivatives with respect to income I and interest rate R, respectively.
Assumption 2. For all (I;R);
Z
￿
xc
2;R(V (I;R;￿);R;￿)dF￿ + Cov
￿
xu
2;I(I;R;￿);
xu
2(I;R;￿)
R2
￿
> 0: (36)
The lemma that follows presents two natural cases in which Assumption 2 holds.
Lemma 3 Assumption 2 holds under the conditions that follow.
1. The function u(x1;x2;￿) is homothetic of degree 1 with respect to (x1;x2).
2. The variance of the shocks is small. Consider a family of distributions fF￿g indexed by
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 with support in [￿L;￿H]: Suppose that F￿(￿) is continuous in (￿;￿) and lim
￿!0
￿F￿ = 0
where ￿F￿ is the variance of F￿: Then there exists 0 < ￿ ￿ < 1 such that for all 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿;
Assumption 2 holds.
Proof. In the Appendix.
The theorem that follows characterizes the constrained e¢ cient allocation SP3 and determines
the form of the liquidity requirement that implements this allocation for di⁄erent forms of these
more general preferences.
Theorem 3 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Let R￿ be the interest rate on the private market in the
solution to the constrained e¢ cient problem SP3.
1. If preferences are of the discount shock form as in example 1; then R￿ > ^ R: Competitive
markets are ine¢ cient, and the liquidity requirement that implements SP3 is a liquidity cap.
2. If preferences are of liquidity shock form as in example 2; then R￿ < ^ R: Competitive markets
are ine¢ cient, and the liquidity requirement that implements SP3 is a liquidity ￿oor.
3. If preferences are valuation-neutral shocks, then R￿ = ^ R. No regulations are needed. More-
over, the solution to the optimal problem SP2 without private markets, constrained e¢ cient
solution with private markets SP3, and the solution to the competitive equilibrium with private
markets CE3 coincide.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Theorem 3 provides a characterization of the constrained e¢ cient allocation and the form of
liquidity adequacy requirement implementing it. We show how the structure of the implementation
depends on agents￿preferences. The proof of the theorem also derives characterization of the interest
rate R￿ in terms of an easily interpretable wedge.
20We now provide a discussion of these examples to highlight the rationale and the direction of the
intervention in Theorem 3. In the case of liquidity shocks (Example 2), the planner wants to allocate
a higher present value of resources to agents with lower ￿ as they have higher marginal lifetime
utility of income. An agent with ￿0 > ￿ wants to engage in the following deviation: pretend to be
an agent with a lower type ￿ and save on the private market. An interest rate R < ^ R discourages
such deviation and relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint. In the case of discount factor
shocks (Example 1), the direction of the deviation is reverse: to pretend to be an agent of higher ￿
and to borrow on the private market. Increasing the interest rate on the private market to R > ^ R
discourages such deviations.14
The case of Diamond-Dybvig preferences is conceptually close to the case of liquidity shocks
preferences in this section. The direction of the relevant deviation and the ability to a⁄ect agents
with a lower interest rate directly generalize to the more general preferences. The important
di⁄erence between these two cases is that, in general, solutions to the constrained e¢ cient problem
with trades, SP3, and constrained e¢ cient problem without trades, SP2 (or problem without
private information, SP1) do not coincide. For Diamond-Dybvig preferences, the solutions to SP1;
SP2; and SP3 coincide. The reason for that is that agents of type ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1 have very
di⁄erent marginal rates of substitution. In the case of ￿ = 0, the marginal rate of substitution
between period t = 1 and t = 2 is zero, and in case of ￿ = 1, the marginal rate of substitution
is one. Such di⁄erences in preferences allow the social planner to perfectly screen the agents of
di⁄erent types. In general, this is not the case, and the solutions to constrained e¢ cient programs
SP2 and SP3 would not coincide.
We now provide another simple case for which a closed form solution may be derived. Consider
the case of liquidity shocks and assume that utility takes the form:
u(c1;c2;￿) =
1
￿
c1 + logc2:15
Assume that the distribution of shocks F (￿) is log-normal with (￿;￿). Then one can show that
the optimal interest rate is given by:
R￿ = ^ Re￿￿2
:
This closed form solution provides us with an additional insight. As the variance of the shocks ￿
increases and the informational friction increases, the optimal interest rate decreases.
14The liquidity cap may appear a somewhat unrealistic requirement. One can, however, argue that it mimics an
implicit subsidy to investment. Such subsidies are prevalent, especially, in the context of encouraging small businesses
(for example, through the Small Business Administration in the USA). One can draw a parallel between agents in
our model who experience liquidity shocks and a model where entrepreneurs face investment risk shocks.
15These preferences do not strictly fall in our speci￿cation of liquidity shocks preferences, u(c1;c2;￿) =
1
￿ ^ u(c1) +
^ u(c2), because the baseline utility functions corresponding to the ￿rst and second period consumption di⁄er. We use
these preferences nevertheless as they admit a simple closed form solution.
2111 Other extensions
In this section we consider three extensions of the model described above: introducing aggregate
shocks, modeling an environment with idiosyncratic shocks to ￿nancial intermediaries, and con-
sidering direct access to intertemporal technology by agents, as well as possibility of heterogenous
￿nancial intermediaries.
11.1 Aggregate shocks
It is easy to extend the model to the case in which the economy experiences aggregate shocks to e
and ^ R that are known in period t = 0. Suppose that there are N aggregate states ￿ = f1;2;::;Ng
and the state is observable. We denote the probability of these states by ￿(￿). We notice that
it is technologically impossible for the society to transfer resources across states. Therefore, the
problem with aggregate shocks can be reduced to solving N independent problems described in
case without aggregate shocks and is, essentially, a comparative statics exercise with respect to the
aggregate shock.
11.2 Idiosyncratic shocks to intermediaries and interbank markets
In this section we discuss an extension of the model to the case in which intermediaries experience
idiosyncratic observable shocks. We show that if there are complete interbank markets then this
model reduces to the case described in previous sections in which all intermediaries are identical.
The intuition for this result is simple: in period 0, intermediaries can trade bonds with the payo⁄
contingent on the shocks realized in period 1. We now illustrate the result for the case with no
aggregate uncertainty in which intermediaries face return shocks.
Formally, we proceed as follows. At time t = 1, an intermediary can face a rate of return shock
n 2 f1;:::;Ng with probability ￿n under which the return on the long asset is ^ R(n). We assume
that there is no aggregate uncertainty and that
N X
n=1
￿n ^ R(n) = ^ R;
N X
n=1
￿n = 1:
At time 0 there are interbank markets in which intermediaries trade N Arrow-Debreu securities.
The price of each security is qn. The security pays 1 if state n occurs and 0 otherwise. Prices qn
are determined by a market clearing condition. It is immediate to see that intermediaries choose
to fully insure themselves at t = 0 against idiosyncratic shocks. The problem of each intermediary
then reduces to the case of no idiosyncratic shocks described above.
2211.3 Direct access to technology
Another variation of our setup is the case in which some agents have access to technology that yields
^ R directly without the need for ￿nancial intermediaries while other agents need an intermediary to
access the technology. If we modi￿ed our assumption that all activities at the level of intermediaries
are observable and instead supposed that the regulator could observe the aggregate investment in
the technology yielding ^ R, then our results would also hold. The constrained optimum in that model
would be implemented by a tax on returns to investment of those who can access the technology and
by a liquidity adequacy requirement on the ￿nancial intermediaries providing liquidity insurance
for agents who cannot access the technology.
11.4 Heterogeneity of ￿nancial intermediaries
The model abstracts from heterogeneity of ￿nancial intermediaries in terms of their size, and from
the fact that, in practice, ￿nancial intermediaries hold assets of di⁄erent risk. It is easy to modify
the setup to consider intermediaries of di⁄erent sizes. One can extend the model and show that
a liquidity requirement in a ratio form, stipulating the proportion of funds invested in a liquid
(short-term) asset would implement the optimal allocation.
If markets are complete as in the discussion above, ￿nancial intermediaries holding assets of
di⁄erent risk engage in transactions among themselves to insure against that risk. If there is an
additional friction, for example, incompleteness of markets for risk sharing among intermediaries,
the size of the liquidity adequacy requirements may need to be modi￿ed to take into account such
friction. In reality, there are a variety of liquidity regulations already imposed on banks, mainly
to control risks. Such regulations would probably perform some of the roles of the social planner
predicted by our model as they increase the aggregate investment in the liquid (short-term) asset
provided by the markets.
12 Conclusion
The theoretical mechanism of this paper addresses a critique of the ￿nancial intermediation liter-
ature: retrading puts signi￿cant limitations on the provision of insurance against liquidity shocks.
We showed that a social planner can signi￿cantly improve the provision of insurance against liquid-
ity shocks even if agents can trade privately. Indeed, in the case of the widely used Diamond-Dybvig
model, the social planner can achieve the ￿rst best. A simple intervention ￿liquidity requirement
￿can implement the constrained e¢ cient allocation. The simplicity of the Diamond-Dybvig model
allows for a transparent characterization of the market failure that we analyze and of the direction
of the intervention needed to correct it.
Currently, other regulations ￿for example, those aimed at controlling the risks taken by ￿nancial
intermediaries ￿are already in place and contribute to alleviating the ine¢ ciencies that we are
describing. Understanding the precise interaction between prudential and liquidity regulations is
an important topic of research.
2313 Appendix
13.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First, we prove that solution to problem SP1 is characterized by (7), (8), and (9). Indeed, c2 (0) > 0
cannot be optimal because agents of type 0 do not value consumption in period t = 2, while if
c1 (1) = z > 0, then changing the allocation to c0
1 (1) = 1 and c0
2 (1) = c2 (1) + ^ Rz would increase
the maximand in (3) while satisfying the feasibility constraint (4). Now (8) is obtained in the
standard way as the ￿rst-order condition for the problem given (7), and the feasibility constraint
may be rewritten as (9). To verify that this allocation is incentive compatible, and thus a solution
to problem SP2, we only need to check that c2 (1) ￿ c1 (0), which follows from ￿ ^ R > 1. This proves
that (6) holds, while (5) is trivial, given c1 (1) = 0).
Let us now show that for the solution to (3) we necessarily have c1 (0) > e and c2 (1) < ^ Re. To
see this, assume for a moment that c1 (0) ￿ e; this implies c2 (1) ￿ ^ Re because of (9) (similarly,
assuming c2 (1) ￿ ^ Re would imply c1 (0) ￿ e). One can prove that if function u satis￿es (1) and
z1 < z2, then
u0 (z1)
u0 (z2)
￿
z2
z1
. (37)
The easiest way to see this is to rewrite (1) as
￿
u00 (c)
u0 (c)
￿
1
c
,
which is equivalent to
￿
￿
logu0 (c)
￿0 ￿ (logc)
0 .
Integrating this from z1 to z2, we get
￿
￿
logu0 (z2) ￿ logu0 (z1)
￿
￿ logz2 ￿ logz1,
and after taking the exponent this becomes (37).
Now, taking z1 = c1 (0) ￿ e < ^ Re ￿ c2 (1) = z2, we get, using (8)
￿ ^ R =
u0 (c1 (0))
u0 (c2 (1))
￿
c2 (1)
c1 (0)
￿
^ Re
e
= ^ R,
which is impossible since ￿ < 1. This contradiction proves that c1 (0) > e and c2 (1) < ^ Re.
13.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of equivalence consists of 2 steps. First, we take a solution fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g to
problem (21) and show that it may be implemented for some I and R satisfying (27), in the sense
that (c1 (￿);c2 (￿)) would solve (24) for any ￿. Second, we take I￿ and R￿ that solve problem
24(26) and show that in that case, fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g given by ct (￿) = xu
t (I;R;￿) are feasible in
problem (21).
Take any solution fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g to problem (21) and let R be the equilibrium interest rate
for the private market given these endowments. Note that the incentive compatibility constraint
(23) can be rewritten as
U(c1(￿);c2(￿);￿) ￿ ~ V (c1(￿0) +
c2(￿0)
R
;R;￿) for all ￿;￿0,
meaning that agent of type ￿ does not get more than utility from endowment by pretending to be
of type ￿0 and then trading in private market. By (24), this implies
~ V (c1(￿) +
c2(￿)
R
;R;￿) ￿ ~ V (c1(￿0) +
c2(￿0)
R
;R;￿) for all ￿;￿0:
Since ~ V is strictly increasing in its ￿rst argument, this is equivalent to
c1(￿) +
c2(￿)
R
= max
￿0
￿
c1(￿0) +
c2(￿0)
R
￿
for all ￿;￿0:
Consequently,
c1(0) +
c2(0)
R
= c1(1) +
c2(1)
R
;
denote this value by I. Let us prove that for (I;R), (c1 (￿);c2 (￿)) solve (24) for any ￿; this would
automatically imply (27) if we take xu
t (I;R;￿) = ct (￿) for all t;￿, because fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g
satis￿es (22). But (c1 (￿);c2 (￿)) constitute a solution (10) and, moreover, these are still a solution
under the additional constraint ￿0 = ￿ which is implicit in (24). This proves that any solution
fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g to problem (21) may be implemented through the appropriate choice of I
and R; note that the values of maximands in (21) and (26) are equal for these parameter val-
ues, hence, the maximum in problem (26) is at least as large as one in problem (21) (recall that
fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g is a solution to problem (21)).
Conversely, suppose that (I￿;R￿) solve problem (26); let fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g be given by
ct (￿) = xu
t (I;R;￿), where fxu
1(I￿;R￿;￿);xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)g￿2f0;1g are solutions to (24) for (I￿;R￿).
We need to check that fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g is feasible for problem (26), i.e., satis￿es (22), (23),
and (??). Clearly, (22) immediately follows from (27). Note that since (25) is binding, we must
have
c1(0) +
c2(0)
R
= c1(1) +
c2(1)
R
= I￿,
meaning that
~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R￿;￿) = V (I￿;R￿;￿) for all ￿,
because with income I￿ for both types and in the presence of private markets a consumer does as
well by reporting truthfully ￿0 = ￿ as he would if he reported ￿0 6= ￿ in (10). Now (23) follows from
the fact that (xu
1(I￿;R￿;￿);xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)) solves (24); (??) follows from the same fact, combined with
25the uniqueness of solution to (24) (in terms of allocations; reported type may not be determined
uniquely because the agent may be indi⁄erent, which is, for instance, true in this case) due to
its convexity. We have proved that if (I￿;R￿) solve problem (26), then the induced allocation
are feasible in the social planner￿ s problem (21). Again, note that for these parameter values the
maximands are equal, which implies that the maximum in problem (21) is at least as large as one
in problem (26).
We have proved that the maximums in problems (21) and (26) coincide. Consequently, any
fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g that solves problem (21) induces (I￿;R￿) which solve (26) and which is such
that (28) holds, and vice versa. This proves the equivalence of problems. We have proved Lemma
2.
13.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We proceed as follows. We show that there exist (I￿;R￿) for which fxu
1(I￿;R￿;￿);xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)g￿2f0;1g,
found as solutions to (24), coincide with the solution to problem SP2 (and thus problem SP1, since
the solutions to those coincide). By Lemma 2, if we de￿ne fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g by (28), conditions
(22), (23), and (??) will be satis￿ed, provided that (27) is satis￿ed. This means that the solution
to problems SP1 and SP2 is feasible for problem SP3. But this implies that it is also a solution to
SP3, because SP3 is obtained from SP1 by imposing additional constraints. Given that solution
to SP1 is unique, we conclude that so is solution to SP3, in particular, income I and interest rate
R are determined uniquely.
De￿ne (I￿;R￿) as solutions the following system of equations:
u0(I) = ￿ ^ Ru0(RI); (38)
I =
e
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)R
^ R
: (39)
In particular, R￿ is a solution to
u0
 
e
￿+(1￿￿)R
^ R
!
u0
￿
Re
￿+(1￿￿) R
^ R
￿ ￿ ￿ ^ R = 0: (40)
Denote by f(R) the left-hand side of (40). Note that f (R) is increasing and f(1) = 1￿￿ ^ R < 0, so
that the solution to (40) involves R￿ > 1: Since the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is everywhere
greater than 1 and R￿ > 1, we can apply (37) to obtain
u0
￿
e
￿+(1￿￿) R￿
^ R
￿
u0
￿
R￿e
￿+(1￿￿) R￿
^ R
￿ ￿ R;
26this show that R￿ ￿ ￿ ^ R. Note that if u(c) = log(c), we have R￿ = ￿ ^ R. We have shown that
R￿ 2 (1;￿ ^ R]. Moreover, this argument establishes existence and uniqueness of (I￿;R￿): indeed, as
we just showed R￿ is uniquely determined by (40), and then I￿ is uniquely determined by (39).
Now let us solve (24) for (I￿;R￿) given by (38) and (39). First, take ￿ = 0; then (24) becomes
max
x1;x2
u(x1)
s.t. (25); the solution is, obviously, xu
1 (I￿;R￿;0) = I￿, xu
2 (I￿;R￿;0) = 0. Now take ￿ = 1; the
problem becomes
max
x1;x2
￿￿u(x1 + x2)
s.t. (25); since R￿ > 1, the solution is xu
1 (I￿;R￿;1) = R￿I￿, xu
2 (I￿;R￿;1) = 0. Let us check that
(8) and (9) are satis￿ed (for ct (￿) = xu
t (I￿;R￿;￿) 8t;￿). Indeed,
u0 (c1 (0)) = u0 (I￿) = ￿ ^ Ru0 (R￿I￿) = ￿ ^ Ru0 (c2 (1));
we used (38) here and, similarly,
￿c1 (0) + (1 ￿ ￿)
c2 (1)
^ R
= ￿I￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
R￿I￿
^ R
= I￿
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
R￿
^ R
￿
= e,
because (I￿;R￿) solves (39). This proves that solution fxu
1(I￿;R￿;￿);xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)g￿2f0;1g of prob-
lem (24) satis￿es (7), (8), and (9), and therefore is a solution to SP1 and SP2. For this allocation,
the feasibility constraint (4) is satis￿ed, and therefore (27) follows (one could also check (27) by
plugging fxu
1(I￿;R￿;￿);xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)g￿2f0;1g found above). Therefore, (I￿;R￿) lead to a feasible
solution of (24), and the allocations obtained for (I￿;R￿) coincide with allocations that solve SP1
and SP2. Since SP3 is a constrained version of these, then (I￿;R￿) is a solution to SP3. This
proves the theorem.
13.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The dual of the program of an intermediary when the interest rate is R￿ and the liquidity require-
ment is i￿ is
max
fc1(￿);c2(￿)g￿2f0;1g
￿~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R￿;0) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R￿;1)
s.t.
￿c1(0) + (1 ￿ ￿)c1(1) ￿ i￿; (41)
c1(0) +
c2(0)
R￿ = c1(1) +
c2(1)
R￿ ; (42)
￿
￿
c1(0) +
c2 (0)
^ R
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
c1(1) +
c2 (1)
^ R
￿
￿ e: (43)
27Here, (42) stems from (18), since we assumed that the interest rate faced by intermediaries and
consumers is R￿, while (43) is simply(20).
Since, as we proved, 1 < R￿ ￿ ￿ ^ R < ^ R, then for any menu of contracts fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g,
each agent of type ￿ = 0 will, after trading on the private market, end up with ￿rst period good
only, and each agent of type ￿ = 1 will end up with second period good only (under the condition
that the market clears). To put it di⁄erently,
~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R￿;0) = u
￿
c1(0) +
c2(0)
R￿
￿
(in the parentheses we have the wealth of agents of type ￿ = 0) and
~ V (fc1 (￿);c2 (￿)g￿2f0;1g ;R￿;1) = ￿u
￿
R￿
￿
c1(1) +
c2(1)
R￿
￿￿
:
Since markets clear, the intermediaries may as well o⁄er contracts with c2 (0) = c1 (1) = 0,
merely providing each consumer with what he would get as a result of the trade. We can therefore
write the program as
max
c1(0);c2(1)
￿u(c1(0)) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿u(c2(1))
s.t.
￿c1(0) ￿ i￿; (44)
￿c1(0) + (1 ￿ ￿)
c2 (1)
^ R
￿ e: (45)
This problem is convex. Hence, if we prove that c1 (0) = I￿ and c2(1) = R￿I￿ satis￿es both
the constraints and the ￿rst order conditions; this would imply that the solution to SP3 is also
the unique competitive equilibrium with the liquidity ￿ oor. It is easy to check that constraints are
satis￿ed as equalities; indeed,
￿c1(0) = ￿I￿ = i￿
by (30), and
￿I￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
R￿I￿
^ R
= I￿
￿
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
R￿
^ R
￿
= e,
because (I￿;R￿) satis￿es (39). Because of complementary slackness conditions, we only need to
verify that the Lagrange multipliers ￿ on the constraint (44) and ￿ on the constraint (45) are
non-negative. The ￿rst-order conditions are
￿u0(I￿) = ￿ (￿￿ + ￿),
(1 ￿ ￿)u0(R￿I￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿
1
^ R
:
Rearranging and using the fact that u0(I￿) = ￿ ^ Ru0(R￿I￿) (which holds since (I￿;R￿) satis￿es (38)),
28we get
￿ = ^ Ru0(R￿I￿) > 0;
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ Ru0(R￿I￿) > 0:
Moreover, no agent wants to borrow or lend at the interest rate R￿ > 1, so the market indeed clears
for such allocation. This completes the proof of the Proposition.
13.5 Proof of Lemma 3
Part 1. If preferences are homothetic, then
Ixu
2;I(I;R;￿)
xu
2(I;R;￿)
= 1: (46)
This implies, ￿rst, that date 2 consumption is a normal good, so that xu
2;I(I;R;￿) > 0: Second, it
implies that Cov
n
xu
2;I(I;R;￿);
xu
2(I;R;￿)
R2
o
￿ 0; which in turn implies assumption 2:
Part 2. Let K be a compact set containing the optimal values of (I;R) for 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Then
there exists M such that for all (I;R) 2 K
￿
￿ ￿
￿Cov
￿
xu
2;I(I;R;￿);
xu
2(I;R;￿)
R2
￿￿
￿ ￿
￿ < M￿2
F￿, (47)
meaning that for ￿ su¢ ciently small, the Lemma holds.
13.6 Proof of Theorem 3
We ￿rst note that the solution to problem (32) is equivalent to the solution of
max
I;R
Z
￿
V (I;R;￿)dF (￿) (48)
subject to Z
￿
￿
xu
1(I;R;￿) +
xu
2(I;R;￿)
^ R
￿
dF (￿) ￿ e: (49)
We now analyze two key ￿rst order conditions that characterize problem (48). Consider the
￿rst order condition of this program with respect to income I:
Z
￿
￿
VI(I;R;￿) ￿ ￿
￿
xu
1;I(I;R;￿) +
xu
2;I(I;R;￿)
^ R
￿￿
dF￿ = 0; (50)
and the ￿rst order condition with respect to interest rate R :
Z
￿
￿
VR(I;R;￿) ￿ ￿
￿
xu
1;R(I;R;￿) +
xu
2;R(I;R;￿)
^ R
￿￿
dF￿ = 0; (51)
29where we denote by ￿ a multiplier on (49), by xu
1;I and xu
2;I the derivatives of the uncompensated
demands with respect to I, and by xu
1;R and xu
2;R derivatives of uncompensated demands with
respect to R.
We manipulate these conditions to obtain a characterization of the optimal wedge between the
interest rate on the private market and the return on savings. As these manipulations are purely
algebraic and use basic properties of the indirect utility functions, we refer the interested reader to
the working paper version of the paper. Speci￿cally, let I￿ and R￿ be solutions to the problem (48).
Let xc
2(I;R;￿) be compensated demand in the problem (24), and xc
2;R(I;R;￿) denote its derivative
with respect to R. Then R￿ satis￿es
1
^ R
￿
1
R￿ =
1
￿ Cov
n
VI(I￿;R￿;￿);
xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)
R￿2
o
R
xc
2;R(V (I￿;R￿;￿);R￿;￿)dF￿ + Cov
n
xu
2;I(I￿;R￿;￿);
xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)
R￿2
o: (52)
Formula (52) characterizes the optimal wedge between the interest rate R￿ and ^ R in terms of
easily interpretable parameters such as indirect utility functions, uncompensated and compensated
demands, and the properties of the distribution of shocks.
Now we turn our attention to the denominator of (52). It is clear that xc
2;R(I;R;￿) > 0; this
is a standard property of compensated demand functions. However, the sign of the denominator
is a priori ambiguous, even under the assumption that VI(I;R;￿) > 0 or VI;￿(I;R;￿) < 0. Using
Lemma 3 we are able to prove that it is positive under certain assumptions
Z
￿
xc
2;R(I;R;￿)dF￿ + Cov
￿
xu
2;I(I;R;￿);
xu
2(I;R;￿)
R2
￿
> 0: (53)
Assumption 1 ensures that @
@￿
￿
xu
2(I;R;￿)
R2
￿
> 0. Then we conclude that if VI;￿(I;R￿;￿) > 0 for all
￿; then Cov
n
VI(I￿;R￿;￿);
xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)
R￿2
o
> 0; if VI;￿(I;R￿;￿) < 0 for all ￿; then Cov
n
VI(I￿;R￿;￿);
xu
2(I￿;R￿;￿)
R￿2
o
<
0.
We now present a lemma that determines how VI(I;R￿;￿) depends on preferences (below, VI;￿
denotes the second partial derivative with respect to I and ￿).
Lemma 4 VI;￿(I;R￿;￿) > 0 for all ￿; if preferences are discount factor shocks as in example 1.
VI;￿(I;R￿;￿) < 0 for all ￿; if preferences are liquidity shocks as in example 2; if preferences are
valuation-neutral shocks as in example 3, VI;￿(I;R￿;￿) = 0 for all ￿:
Proof. We have
V (I;R;￿) = max
x1;x2
u(x1;x2;￿)
subject to
x1 +
x2
R
￿ I.
Suppose ￿rst that preferences are given by u(x1)+￿u(x2): Then, substituting x1 using the budget
30constraint, we can rewrite this problem as
V (I;R;￿) = max
x2
^ u
￿
I ￿
x2
R
￿
+ ￿^ u(x2):
By the Envelope theorem, we have
V￿(I;R;￿) = ^ u(xu
2(I;R;￿)):
Hence,
VI;￿ = ^ u0(xu
2(I;R;￿))xu
2;I(I;R;￿) > 0:
Suppose now that preferences are given by 1
￿u(x1) + u(x2): By the Envelope theorem, we have
V￿(I;R;￿) = ￿
1
￿2 ^ u(xu
1(I;R;￿)):
Hence
VI;￿ =
￿1
￿2 ^ u0(xu
2(I;R;￿))xu
1;I(I;R;￿) < 0:
For the value neutral preferences VI;￿ = 0.
This proves the Lemma.
Now apply Lemma 4 to formula (52) to get the results on the optimal interest rates. Let I￿
and R￿ be the solutions to (48) and let
i￿ =
Z
￿
xu
1(I￿;R￿;￿)dF (￿)
When R￿ < ^ R; the intermediaries want to invest as much as possible in the long asset and let agents
borrow on the private market against future payments by the intermediary, to take advantage of
the interest rate di⁄erence. In this case, liquidity ￿ oor ￿xed at i￿ would be binding for them. A
similar reasoning applies when R￿ > ^ R: in that case, one would need to impose a liquidity cap.
Combined with the resource constraint faced by each intermediary, this is enough to prove that
they will o⁄er exactly the allocation prescribed by (48).
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